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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
APPLICABLE TO BILLS AND NOTES
III. INTERPRETATION AND OBLIGATION*
A. THE GOVERNING LAW.
2. RELATIONSHIP OF THE DIFFERENT CONTRACTS.
a. Theory of the Independence of the Different Contracts.
Whichever rule is adopted as the governing law the question
will be whether the obligation of the maker's, acceptor's, draw-
er's and indorser's contracts entered into in different jurisdic-
tions shall be subjected to different laws, or whether all of the
parties must be presumed to have contracted with reference
to a single law.
(1) English Law: Section 72, Bills of Exchange Act
provides:
"(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the interpreta-
tion of the drawing, indorsement, acceptance, or acceptance
supra protest of a bill, is determined by the law of the place
where such contract is made."
"(3) The duties of the holder with respect to present-
ment for acceptance or payment and the necessity for or
sufficiency of a protest or notice of dishonour, or otherwise,
are determined by the law of the place where the act is done
or the bill is dishonoured."
(2) American Law: The great weight of authority ap-
plies the law of the place of performance to each of the con-
tracts on a bill or note, and holds that the drawer and indorser
do not promise to pay at the place of payment of the principal
obligation, but at the place where their contract is entered
into.4 A few cases take the contrary view.47
(3) French Law: The -contracts of the drawer and in-
dorser are subject to the law of the place where they are
*Continued from 1 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, p. 256.
46. Crawford v. Bank, (1844) 6 Ala. 12, 41 Am. Dec. 33; Hunt v.
Standart, (1860) 15 Ind. 33, 77 Am. Dec.'79; National Bank v. Green,(1871) 33 Ia. 140; Short v. Trabue, (1863) 4 Met. (Ky.) 301; Wood v.
Gibbs, (1858) 35 Miss. 559; Price v. Page, (1856) 24 Mo. 67; Briggs v.
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entered into, unless an intention to the contrary appears.4 8
(4) German Law: The German law agrees with the ma-
jority rule in the United States.49
(5) Italian Law: The law of Italy agrees in general with
that of France.50 When the parties are subjects of the same
country they will be deemed to have contracted with reference
to their national law.51
The law of the above countries is thus agreed upon the
principle of the independence of the different contracts on a
bill or note. They regard the law of the place where the con-
tract of a drawer or indorser is entered into as controlling the
obligation of the contract. France and Italy do so in conform-
ity with the doctrine of the applicability of the lex loci con-
tractus, while Germany and the United States reach the same
result by virtue of the application of the lex loci solutionis,
which they regard as coinciding with the lex loci contractus.
In the words of Story:
"The drawer and indorsers do not contract to pay the
money in the foreign place on which the bill is drawn; but only
to guarantee its acceptance and payment in that place by the
drawee; and in default of such payment they agree upon due
notice to reimburse the holder in principal and damages at
the place where they respectively entered into the contract. '"5 2
Latham, (1887) 36 Kan. 255, 59 Am. Rep. 546; Kuenzli v. Elvers, (1859)
14 La. Ann. 391, 74 Am. Dec. 434; Freese v. Brownell, (1871) 35 N. J. L.
285, 10 Am. Rep. 239; Mackintosh v. Gibbs, (1911) 81 N. J. L. 577, 80 At1.
554, Ann. Cas. 1912D 163; Trabue v. Short, (1866) 18 La. Ann. 257;
Powers v. Lynch, (1807) 3 Mass. 77; Williams v. Wade, (1840) 1 Met.
(Mass.) 82; Aymar v. Sheldon, (1834) 12 Wend. 439, 27 Am. Dec. 137;
Spies v. National City Bank, (1903) 174 N. Y. 222; 66 N. E. 736; 61 L. R.
A. 193; Amsinck v. Rogers, (1907) 189 N. Y. 252, 82 N. E. 134, 121 Am.
St. Rep. 858, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 875; Lenning v. Ralston, (1854) 23 Pa.
St. 137; Read v. Adams, (1821) 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 356; Douglas v. The
Bank of Commerce, (1896) 97 Tenn. 133, 36 S. W. 874; Warren v.
Citizens Bank, (1894) 6 S. D. 152, 60 N. W. 746; Raymond v. Holmes,
(1853) 11 Tex. 54.
47. Dunn v. Welsh, (1879) 62 Ga. 241; Hibernian National Bank v. La-
combe, (1881) 84 N. Y. 367; Peck v. Mayo, (1842) 14 Vt. 33, 39 Am.
Dec. 205.
48. Cass. Feb. 6, 1900 (S. 1900. 1. 161).
49. 9 RG 431 (March 28, 1883); 24 RG 112 (Nov. 5, 1889); 44 RG 431
Oct. 4, 1889).
0. Cass. Florence April 8, 1895 (S. 1896. 4. 7); Cass. Florence Jan. 16,
1888 (15 Clunet 735).
51. Art. 9. Prel. Disp. Civil Code; Cass. Naples, Jan. 4, 1898 (La Legge,
1898. 1. 617).
52. Sec. 315.
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The same view is expressed by Chancellor T. Pemberton
Leigh in the case of Allen v. Keinble.53 He says:
"It is argued, that this bill, being drawn payable in London,
not only the acceptor, but the drawer, must be held to have
contracted with reference to the English law. This argument,
however, appears to us to be founded on a misapprehension
of the obligation which the drawer and indorser of a bill incurs.
The drawer, by his contract, undertakes that the drawee shall
accept and shall afterwards pay the bill, according to its tenor,
at the place and domicile of the drawee if it be drawn and
accepted generally: at the place appointed for payment, if it
be drawn and accepted, payable at a different place from the
place of domicile of the drawee. If this contract of the drawer
be broken by the drawee, either by non-acceptance or non-
payment, the drawer is liable for payment of the bill, not where
the bill was to be paid by the drawee, but where he, the drawer,
made his contract, with his interest, damages, and costs, as the
law of the country where he contracted may allow."
As for the English law, it is difficult to harmonize subdivi-
sions (2) and (3) of Section 72 of the Bills of Exchange Act.
For an explanation of the subdivisions see the beginning of
Part III. As it stands, the interpretation and obligation of
the different contracts would be governed by the law of the
place where such contracts are made, while the necessity of
presentment, protest and notice are controlled "by the law of
the place where the act is done or the bill is dishonoured."
b. Theory that a Single Law Should Govern. Under the
doctrine of the independence of the different contracts there is
a possibility that one party may be liable under the law gov-
erning his contract, and yet because of a -difference in the law
governing the other contracts, have lost, without any personal
fault of his own, all rights of recourse against the prior parties.
Such a contingency is avoided if all parties can be deemed to
have contracted with reference to a single law (Einheits-
theorie). Some of the older authors5 4 were of the opinion that
all of the parties must be deemed to have contracted with ref-
erence to the law of the domicile of the drawee which they re-
garded as the place at which the exchange contract had its
seat, but this theory is now completely abandoned on the con-
53. (1848) 6 Moore P. C. 314.
54. Pothier, Trait6 du Contrat de Change, Sec. 155; Brocher, Cours, II,
pp. 315-16.
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tinent, where the doctrine of the independence of the different
contracts is admitted on principle by all at the present day.55
In this country the old view is still entertained by a few
authors. Minor does so upon grounds of expediency. He
says:
"Expediency would seem to pronounce in favor of the lat-
ter view, and it is believed to be the better. To give every in-
dorsement its own separate locality would impair most seri-
ously the value of all negotiable instruments, even those which
are in fact purely domestic, since the holder could not know
where the prior indorsements were made and hence could not
tell what the liabilities of the prior indorsers are, nor what
steps he must take to secure that liability. The tendency of
this rule is to destroy or impair the negotiability of such in-
struments. On the other hand, to hold the locus solutionis
of each indorsement to be identical with the locus solutionis
of the original contract creates one single law by which the
liabilities of all the indorsers are to be ascertained, and would
prevent the inconvenience (to use a mild term) to the holder
of having to ascertain and comply with a number of different
laws as to protest, notice of dishonor, and other steps to be
taken in order to fasten responsibility upon the indorsers."
Danie 5 7 reaches the same conclusion on principle. His
view is set forth in the following words:
"This doctrine that the drawer and indorser are bound ac-
cording to the law of the place of drawing or indorsing, al-
though sustained by great weight of opinion, and an over-
whelming current of authorities, has not escaped criticism and
dissent, and rests, as it seems to us, rather upon the sanction
of decisions than upon clear and well-defined principles. If
A, in New York, draws a bill on B, in Richmond, directing him
to pay $1,000 at the First National Bank, in Raleigh, N. C., he
thereby guarantees to C, the payee, that the money shall be
there paid by B on the day of its maturity. He is as clearly
bound as B is, although secondarily, that the money shall be
paid at the time and at the place named. If either tenders the
amount at the time and place, it would be a good tender. And,
although A's liability is contingent upon due notice of dis-
honor, the liability is, nevertheless, for breach of his contract
55. Asser, p. 210; Audinet, pp. 612-18: von Bar, p. 677; Champcommunal,
Annales de Droit Commercial. 1894, II, p. 155; Despagnet, p. 990: Diena,
III, p. 601; Principi, II, p. 212: Fiore. I, p. I78; Esperon. p. 18: Griinhiit,
II, pp. 578-79; Jitta, II, p. 76; Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, pp. 558-59; Meili,
II, p. 334; Ottolenghi, p. 165; Schiffner, p. 121; Valiry, p. 1283; Weiss, IV,
p. 459.
56. P. 396.
57. Sec. 901.
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that B should pay at Raleigh. He has contracted that the
amount shall be there paid by the hand of B, and yet his con-
tract is regarded as being governed by the law of New York;
while B's contract to pay by his own hand is governed by the
laws of North Carolina. This seems to us an inconsistency of
the law; and while the doctrine is now perhaps too well settled
to be disturbed, it does not bear the test of searching analysis."
c. Resolutions of the Institute of International Law. The
Institute adopted the theory of the independence of the differ-
ent contracts in the following resolution :58
"II. The effect and validity of a bill of exchange and a
promissory note, of the indorsements, acceptance, and aval
shall be governed by the law of the country in which these dif-
ferent acts occurred, without prejudice to the rules relative to
the capacity of the parties. . .
The theory is abandoned, however, in important respects.
The following resolutions show the extent to which the law
of the place of issue is to control. 59
"II. . . . The effect of the supervening contracts how-
ever, shall not be greater in extent than that resulting from
the creation of the instrument itself.
"III. The time allowed for presentment of bills of ex-
change and promissory notes payable at sight or after sight
is determined by the law of the place where the original in-
strument was issued.
"IV. The duties of the holder with respect to presentment
for acceptance and payment are fixed by the law of the place
where the bill or note has been issued.
"VI. The defence of accident and vis major is allowed
only if it is recognized by the law of the place of issue of the
original instrument.
"VII. The time within which the right of recourse may be
exercised against the indorsers or the other guarantors and
against the drawer, or within which a direct action may be
brought against the acceptor, is fixed by the law of the country
in which the act which gives rise to the action took place.
"However, as against the indorsers and the other guaran-
tors, the time can never exceed that laid down for the right of
recourse against the drawer."
In some respects the law of the place of payment governs.
Resolution V provides :60
58. Annuaire, VIII, p. 121.
59. Id., pp. 121-22.
60. Id., p. 122.
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"The law of the place where payment is to be made deter-
mines the mode of showing default of acceptance or payment
and the form of protest, as well as the time within which it
may be made.
"The notices to be given to the guarantors for the preserva-
tion of the right of recourse in case of default of acceptance
or payment and the time within which such notices may be
given, are governed by the law of the place from which these
notices are to be sent."
d. Discussion of Foregoing Theories. The theory that a
single law should govern the obligations of the various parties
to a bill or note has obvious advantages over that of the inde-
pendence of the different contracts. In case of recourse no
difficulties can arise under the former theory from a possible
difference in the law of the states in which the contracts of the
different parties may have been entered into. If in the framing
of the Uniform Law a single law were to be chosen to regu-
late the rights and obligations of all parties, such a result
might be reached by one of two courses. The law of the place
of payment might be accepted as the rule governing the obli-
gation of contracts with a provision that the contracts of the
drawer and indorser shall imply a promise to pay at the place
where the principal obligor agrees to pay, instead of being re-
garded as contracts of indemnity. The other course would be
to recognize the lex loci contractus as the controlling law and
then to provide that all parties must be deemed to have con-
tracted with reference to the law of the place of issue of the
original instrument. The writer of this article is not able to
recommend the adoption of either of these courses. He can-
not accept the view underlying the resolutions of the Institute
of International Law because there is no reason to assume that
when the different parties entered into their respective con-
tracts they had in contemplation the law governing the draw-
er's contract. In so far as the nature of the original contract
is concerned such a presumption is perfectly fair and neces-
sary. For example, where the original instrument is negotia-
able under the law of the place of issue an indorser by the very
act of becoming a party to such instrument may be presumed
to have intended to incur the liability of an indorser of a ne-
gotiable bill or note. However, an assumption that the con-
tract of the acceptor and the indemnity contracts of the in-
dorsers were all entered into with reference to the law creating
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the original instrument is quite another matter and does not
rest upon a reasonable basis. Every probability favors the
presumption that each of them at the time of entering the
contract had in mind the lex loci of his own contract.
The alternative first suggested rests upon two assump-
tions: First, that the lex loci solutionis determines the obliga-
tion of contracts; second, that the drawer and indorser promise
to pay at the place of payment of the bill or note. 61 As the
writer of this article is of the opinion that the Uniform Law
should adopt the lex loci contractus as the governing rule and
not the lex loci solutionis, it is impossible for him to approve
the solution suggested by Minor and Daniel. If, contrary to
the author's recommendation, the Uniform Law should adopt
the lex loci solutionis, the question would be whether the law
of the place of payment of the bill or note should not be chosen
also as the law controlling all supervening contracts. This
could be done by accepting the view that the drawer and in-
dorser promise to pay at the place of payment of the bill or
note and not where they entered their respective contracts.
Such a rule would run, however, counter to the overwhelming
weight of authority on this point in this country. It would be
opposed also to the law of England, 2 France and Italy and to
that of Germany, notwithstanding the fact that the lex loci
solutionis controls the obligation of contracts in Germany. As
for the text writers, most of them feel that the traditional rule
should be retained. 3 The author is not satisfied that any de-
viation from strict principle is necessary. It is true that under
the doctrine of the independence of the different contracts it is
possible for one party to be held under the lex loci of his con-
tract although all means of recourse may be cut off against all
prior parties. But such a contingency would not be removed
61. The phrase "place of payment of the bill or note" is used here to
designate the place where the maker of a note or the acceptor of a bill of
exchange agrees to pay, and the residence of the drawee, where the bill
is not accepted.
62. See Gibbs v. Fremont, (1853) 9 Exch. 25; Chalmers, pp. 244-45.
63. Asser, p. 210; Audinet, p. 620; Beauchet, Annales de Droit Commer-
cial, 1888, II, p. 63; Diena, III, p. 209; Fiore, Elementi, p. 459; Otto-
lenghi, p. 472; Surville et Arthuys, p. 690; Staub, Art. 86, Sec. 8.
A good many writers, however, feel that, inasmuch as the creditor
is being kept out of his money at the place of payment of the original
instrument, the law of that state should govern the measure of damages
with respect to all parties. Von Bar, p. 681; Champcommunal, Annales
de Droit Commercial, 1894, II, p. 259; Chrdtien, p. 213; Esperson, p. 75;
Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 561; Valdry, p. 1288; Weiss IV, p. 467.
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completely, even if the view of Daniel and Minor were ac-
cepted, unless the Statute of Limitations were regarded as
relating to the substance rather than to procedure and were
governed by the lex loci solutionis instead of by the law of
the forum, as is the established rule in England and the United
States, and it is doubtful whether the American law is ready
to adopt the continental rule in this respect. With the reason-
able limitations that should be placed upon the doctrine of the
independence of the different contracts on a bill or note, as will
appear below, it is believed that cases of actual hardship will
arise only under exceptional circumstances. In the estima-
tion of the writer there are thus no sufficient grounds for the
adoption by the Uniform Law of the theory of a single law
governing all of the contracts, in either of the forms above
suggested. The author would recommend, therefore, the
adoption of Article 72 (2) paragraph 1 of the Bills of Exchange
Act, notwithstanding the fact that this particular provision
may have found its way into the English law as the result of
a misunderstanding of Story.
e. Limits of the Theory of the Independence of the Dif-
ferent Contracts. All authorities supporting the doctrine of
the independence of the different contracts on a bill or note
are forced to admit that there are necessary limitations to the
operation of this rule. These limitations result from the fact
that there is but one original instrument and contract, all the
other contracts being superimposed or accessory. The courts,
however, have not always borne in mind that the doctrine of
the independence of the different contracts cannot be reason-
ably carried to the point of affecting the nature or interpreta-
tion of the original instrument. In the absence of an express
qualification the reasonable assumption must be that each
party accepting or indorsing a bill or note must have done so
upon the basis of the original contract.
There is universal agreement that everything affecting the
manner of presentment for acceptance and payment and the
mode of protesting a bill or note must be done in accordance
with the law of the state in which such presentment and pro-
test must be made. This rule is the only practicable one.
Hence all other parties are deemed to have intended, as reason-
able men, that the acts which have to be done in a particular
place should be carried out in the mode prescribed by the law
or usage prevailing at such place.
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Beyond this there is conflict. Most of the problems will
be considered separately later in this article. They will raise
the question whether one law should determine, with respect
to all parties (1) the maturity of the instrument; (2) the time
within which the presentment of bills of exchange, payable at
sight or after sight, must be made; (3) the amount of re-
covery; (4) the necessity of presentment, protest and notice;
(5) the time within which notice must be given; (6) the de-
fence of accident or vis major.
One of the problems that may be discussed to advantage in
this place relates to the negotiability of the instrument. We
must assume in the present discussion that the instrument is a
bill or note, for we are considering here the obligation of a
contract and not the validity of the instrument as a bill or note.
The latter question was discussed in Part II of this article.
The present problem may be suggested by means of the fol-
lowing cases:
1. Suppose that Jones executes in London to Smith of
New York, a promissory note in which he promises to pay
Smith $500. Smith indorses the note in New York to Adams.
Neither the original instrument nor the indorsement contain
words of negotiability. Under the Bills of Exchange Act the
note is fully -negotiable; under the law of New York it is not,
for want of words indicating that it is payable "to order or
bearer." Has Smith indorsed a negotiable or a non-negoti-
able note?
2. Suppose that a note is made and payable in the state of
X to "Smith or order", that it is indorsed by Smith in the
state of Y and that the note is not commercial paper under
the law of the state of Y, although it is fully negotiable under
the law of the state of X, can Smith be held as the indorser of
commercial paper?
3. Suppose that the note in the first case was issued in
New York and was indorsed in London, the instrument and
the indorsement having the same form as before.
4. Suppose that the note in the second case was executed
in the state of Y and was indorsed in the state of X, the instru-
ment and the indorsement having the same form as before.
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There are cases64 in this country similar to the second one,
of which Hyatt v. The Bank of Kentucky 65 is typical. In that
case a note, executed and payable in Louisiana, was indorsed
in Kentucky. It was held that the quality of the instrument
as commercial paper should be determined, as regards the
Kentucky indorser, in accordance with the law of Kentucky.
The reasoning of the court was as follows:
"Those, however, who become parties to it in Kentucky
by indorsement, the legal effect of this indorsement, so far as
it applies to them, must be determined by Kentucky law; nor
will the existence of extrinsic circumstances, such as the
knowledge on the part of the indorser of the legal character
of the paper where it was enacted, change the character or
degree of his liability. A party may know when he indorses a
paper in Kentucky executed in Louisiana, that the law of the
latter state imposes a different liability from the law of Ken-
tucky, and still his assignment, being of itself an independent
contract, must be regulated by" the law where the contract is
made, and no presumption should be indulged in to change its
legal effect; and if presumptions are to determine these ques-
tions, it would be equally as just to presume that the party
intended to be bound by the law of the place or state where
the contract was made as that he intended to make himself
liable under another and different law.
"It is to the interest of trade and commerce that there
should be some fixed and permanent rule governing contracts
of this character; and, with this rule established, no mere cir-
cumstances or presumptions should be permitted to fix a lia-
bility upon such paper other than the liability imposed by the
law of the place where the contract is made."
Not only may the law governing the contracts of the differ-
ent parties to a bill or note determine whether, with respect to
such parties, the instrument shall be deemed negotiable, but
the law of the forum also may control this question, for ex-
ample, when the right of the assignee or indorsee to sue in his
own name is involved. 68
64. Hyatt v. The Bank of Kentucky, (1871) 8 Bush. (Ky.) 193; Nichols
v. Porter, (1867) 2 W. Va. 13. 94 Am. Dec. 501. See also Baker Company
v. Brown, (1913) Z14 Mass. 196, 100 N. E. 1025.
65. (1871) 8 Bush. (Ky.) 193.
66. See Roads v. Webb, (1898) 91 Me. 406; 40 Atl. 128; Haker v. Nat.
Bank, (1895) 61 Ill. App. 501; Woods v. Ridley, (1850) 11 Humph.
(Tenn.) 194; Lodge v. Phelps, (1799) 1 Johns. Cas. 139; Warren v.
Copelin, (1842) 4 Met. (Mass.) 594.
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In the last edition of Wharton,67 the following summary
statement is made concerning the law governing the negoti-
ability of instruments.
"The cases, however, are by no means agreed that the
question as to the negotiability of a particular instrument is
always to be determined by the law of the same jurisdiction,
without reference to the particular quality or incident involved
in the case. For this reason the question of the governing law
with respect to negotiability cannot be satisfactorily treated
in a general and abstract manner, and without reference to the
particular quality or incident dependent upon the character
of the instrument in that respect.
"It may be pointed out in this connection, however, that
according to the weight of authority, although there is some
conflict upon the point, the negotiability of an instrument, as
affecting the respective rights of one who has been fraudulently
deprived of it, and one who has obtained the same from or
through a third person who had no authority to transfer it,
depends upon the law of the place where the transfer to the
present holder took place, and not necessarily upon the sub-
stantive law of the original contract."
Lack of space precludes a thorough treatment of this ques-
tion at the present time. It may be, that the English cases
cited in support of the last paragraph quoted from Wharton,"8
relating as they do to foreign government bonds and to certifi-
cates of stock in foreign corporations, laid down a rule which
is dictated by sound considerations of policy, especially in a
place like England which has been the leading financial center
of the world. Whatever attitude policy may dictate in this
regard, it is submitted that the same considerations are not
necessarily applicable to bills and notes. On the continent it
is generally assumed that the law of the place of issue must fix
the character of the instrument throughout its life, and that all
parties, in the absence of an express declaration to the con-
67. By Parmele, II, p. 966.
68. The cases relied upon are the following: Gorgier v. Mieville, (1824) 3
Barn. & C. 45, 4 Dowl. & R. 641, 2 L. J. K. B. 206; Lang v. Smyth, (1831)
7 Bing, 284, 5 Moore & P. 78, 9 L. J. C. P. 91; Goodwin v. Robarts, (1876)
L. R. 1 App. Cas. 476, 45 L. J. Exch. N. S. 748, 35 L. T. N. S. 179, 24 W.
R. 987; Picker v. London & County Bkg. Co., (1887) L. R. 18 Q. B. Div.
515, 56 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 299. 35 W. R. 469; Williams v. Colonial Bank,(1888) L. R. 38 Ch. Div. 388. 57 L. T. Ch. N. S. 826, 59 L. T. N. S.
643, 36 W. R. 625; affirmed in L. R. 15 App. Cas. 267, 60 L. J. Ch. N. S.
136, 63 L. T. N. S. 27, 39 W. R. 17.
See also Baker Co. v. Brown, (1913) 214 Mass. 196, 100 N. E. 1025
Cotmpare Wylie v. Speyer. (1881) 62 How. Pr. 107; Savings Bank v. Nat.
Bank of Commerce, (1889) 38 Fed. 800.
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trary, must be deemed to have contracted upon that basis."9
The writer of this article is of the opinion that this represents
the correct view, at least with regard to the supposititious
cases (1) and (2) above. Why should a party, accepting oi
indorsing a bill or note, executed in another state or country,
be allowed to question the character of the instrument? Such
a right is certainly not in furtherance of the security of dealings
in negotiable paper. The very object of the law of bills ond
notes is to facilitate the circulation of these instruments. Un-
less considerations of justice to the acceptor and indorser make
it imperative that the character of the original instrument be
determined in accordance with his own law, the law of the orig-
inal place of issue should certainly control. Otherwise a bill
or note intended to be negotiable and so created by the law
of the place of issue would cease to be such with respect to
the acceptor or any one of the indorsers if the lex loci of their
resliective contracts should regard the instrument as non-ne-
gotiable. However true the doctrine of the independence of
the different contracts may be in general, the fact remains
that there is one original contract and that the rest are super-
imposed upon and have for their purpose the carrying out of
the original contract. [t is difficult to see how an acceptor or
an indorser can complain if he is charged with knowledge of
the law of the state or country in which the instrument is
issued. His willingness to become a party to such an instru-
ment implies, of itself, a readiness to contract on the basis of
its original character. Based upon commercial convenience,
because of its tendency to facilitate the circulation of bills and
notes, and the security of dealings with respect thereto, a pre-
sumption to this effect is, to say the least, reasonable.
It does not follow, however, that the same principle must,
of necessity, be applied to the supposititious cases (3) and (4).
Just as in the matter of formality where the original instru-
ment is void for want of compliance with the law of the place
of issue, but is valid under the lex loci contractus governing
the acceptor's or the indorser's contract, liability is imposed by
the English and German acts on mere grounds of policy,
having for its object the security of local dealings in bills and
notes, for like reasons it may be provided in the supposititious
69. See Diena, Principi, II, p. 312; Ottolenghi, p. 211; von Bar, p. 676,
note 47.
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cases (3) and (4) that the indorser of a note, which is non-ne-
gotiable under the law of the place of issue, but is negotiable
under that of the place of indorsement, shall be deemed to
have assumed the liability of a regular indorser of commercial
paper.
The attitude of the American courts, determining the
negotiability of bills and notes now by one law, now by
another, according to the nature of the question before them,
or the party that is being sued, is responsible for much of the
confusion now to be found in the law of bills and notes, and
cannot be condemned too severely.
B. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS.
1. EFFECT OF NEGOTIATION IN ANOTHER STATE.
The contracts of the maker and acceptor, in accordance
with the foregoing conclusion, are subject to the law of the
place of contracting." This law should determine the nature,
interpretation and obligation of the contract, the conditions
upon which liability is assumed and the defenses, legal and
equitable, which may be available.7 ' As regards the contracts
of the drawer and indorser it has been'pointed out that they
are independent contracts, the interpretation and obligation
of which should be governed by the lex loci contractus.' This
law should determine, therefore, the nature and obligation of
the drawer's and indorser's contracts in general, the condi-
tions upon which their liability depends and the defences which
they may have.
The liability of each party to a bill or note is fixed once for
all by the proper law and is unaffected by a transfer of the
instrument in another state. If the law governing his contract
allows a certain defence, even as against a holder in due course,
it will be available to him notwithstanding the fact that the
bill or note was negotiated in a jurisdiction under the law of
70. See the cases collected in 61 L. R. A. pp. 206-12, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.)
pp. 670-72.
71. On the continent the lex loci of the acceptor's contract will deter-
mine also the question whether an acceptance of a bill of exchange raises
a presumption in favor of the existence of a "cover." Audinet, p. 615;
Diena, III, p. 126; Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 558; Ottolenghi, p. 194.
72 See the cases collected in 61 L. R. A. pp. 215-22, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.)
pp. 672-74.
As regards the regular indorser, see 61 L. R. A. pp. 200-02, 19 L. R.
A. (N. S.) pp. 668-70.
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which a holder in due course is protected against such a de-
fence.73 All courts admit also that the character of the instru-
ment as a negotiable or non-negotiable instrument cannot be
affected, as regards each party, by a transfer of the bill or note
in another state or country where the law is different.74
2. LAW GOVERNING PLAINTIFF'S TITLE.
Each party promises to pay the sum specified in the instru-
ment in accordance with the tenor of his contract, which pre-
supposes that the holder has acquired a valid title to the bill
or note. The question now is whether the title must be good
according to the municipal law of bills and notes of the country
in which the party to be charged assumed liability or does the
promise to pay embrace any person who has acquired a valid
title under the law of the place where the transfer occurred?
a. English Law: The Bills of Exchange Act provides as
follows :5
"Subject to the provisions of this Act the interpretation of
the drawing, indorsement, acceptance, or acceptance supr .
protest of a bill, is determined by the law of the place where
such contract is made.
"Provided that where an inland bill is indorsed in a foreign
country the indorsement shall, as regards the payor, be in-
terpretated according to the law of the United Kingdom."
According to this section the acceptor of an order bill
promises to pay the same to a party who has acquired title
thereto by an indorsement which is valid under the law of the
place of indorsement, but the contract of the acceptor of an
inland bill, which is indorsed in a foreign country, is to pay
to any order or upon any indorsement which is valid by the
mercantile law of England. Before the Bills of Exchange Act
the English law was in an uncertain state.7 6
73. Ory v. Winter, (1826) 4 Mart. (N. S.) 277. See also Diena, III, p.
88; Jitta, II, p. 176; Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, p. 559; Ottolenghi, p. 219;
Weiss, IV, p. 461.
74. Krieg v. Palmer Nat. Bank, (Ind. App. 1911) 95 N. E. 613.
75. B. E. A. Sec. 72 (2).
76. In Lebel v. Tucker, (1867) L. R. 3 Q. B. 77, action was brought against
the acceptor of a bill of exchange which was drawn, accepted and pay-
able in England, but was indorsed in blank in France. The court held that
"the acceptor having contracted in England to pay in England, the con-
tract must be interpreted and governed by the law of England." There
being nothing on the face of the instrument to indicate that the parties
contemplated that it might come under the operation of a foreign law
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b. American Law: There are no American cases which
are helpful in the matter now under consideration.
c. Continental Law: The Continental law seems to apply
the law of the place of indorsement without recognizing a
qualification like that laid down by the English Act.
The English courts before the Bills of Exchange Act
operated seemingly with the intention theory. If the nego-
tiation of the instrument abroad was, or must be deemed to
have been, within the contemplation of the maker or acceptor,
liability would exist in favor of an indorsee who had acquired
title under the law of the place of indorsement; whereas if no
such negotiation was contemplated, the indorsee's title would
be determined by the law governing the maker's or acceptor's
contract. Notwithstanding a contemplated negotiation abroad,
the transfer need not conform, however, to the law of the place
of indorsement whenever it clearly appears from the terms of
the instrument that the parties contracted witlh reference to
the law of England.
The intention theory, as appears from the English cases,
leads to very uncertain results. This is inevitable because of
the absence of fixed criteria from which the intention of the
parties can be ascertained. The English cases, before the
the English law was deemed to express the presumptive intention of the
parties. The argument that the indorsement was not sufficient between the
indorser and the indorsee and could not transfer, therefore, to the latter,
rights against the acceptor was held to be immaterial.
In Bradlaugh v. De Rin, (1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 538 a bill was drawn
in Belgium on England. It was accepted in England and was indorsed in
blank in Belgium. By a divided court it was held that the lav of Belgium
must determine the right of the indorsee to sue the acceptor. The court
assumed that the indorsee could have no rights against the acceptor unless
the indorsement transferred such rights to him under the law of the
state where the indorsement was made, the reason being that if the
drawer cannot be made liable, the acceptor paying the instrument cannot
charge the sum against him. The court overlooked the fact, seemingly,
that the argument would apply equally to Lebel v. Tucker. The real ex-
planation of the two cases lies probably in the fact that in Lebel v.
Tucker an indorsement abroad was not deemed within the contemplation
of the parties while it must have been in Bradlaugh v. De Rin.
In the latest English case on the subject, In re Marseilles Exten-
sion Railway & Land Company, (1885) 30 Ch. D. 598, a bill was drawn
in France by a Frenchman in the French language but in the English
form on a company in England. It was both accepted and payable in
England, and was indorsed in blank in France. In an action against the
acceptor it was held that English law must govern because the special
facts in the case showed an intention that it be an English bill.
77. See Everett v. Vendryes, (1859) 19 N. Y. 436; Brook v. Vannest,
(1895) 58 N. J. L. 162, 33 Atl. 382.
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passing of the Bills of Exchange Act, were cases where the
English law was more liberal than the foreign law in the mat-
ter of negotiation. All involved the question of blank in-
dorsements and it was erroneously assumed that the law of
the foreign country denied to the indorsee under such an
indorsement the right to sue in his own name. As the Con-
vention of the Hague has accepted the Anglo-American law
in regard to blank indorsements,7 it is improbable that cases
similar to the above will be presented to an English or Amer-
ican court in the future.
A wide difference between Anglo-American law and that
of the Hague Convention continues to exist concerning the
genuineness of the indorsements. Under Anglo-American law
title cannot be acquired through a forged indorsement.79
According to the Convention of the Hague the chain of in-
dorsements need only be regular; the indorsements are not
required to be genuine.8 0 Supposing now that a party has
taken a bill or note under such a forged indorsement in a
country where it will not affect his title, will he be able to
recover as against an English or an American maker or ac-
ceptor? This situation was presented in the case of Embiricos
v. Anglo-Austrian Bank.8' In that case a Roumanian bank
drew a check on a London bank payable to the order of A.
A indorsed the check in Roumania specially to B in London.
The check was stolen by A's clerk and was cashed in good
faith and without gross negligence by a bank in Vienna. At
the time of such payment the indorsements were apparently
regular and in order, although B's signature was forged. The
Vienna! bank indorsed the check to C in London, who pre-
sented it to the bank on which it was drawn and received
payment. In an action by A against C for conversion, Walton,
J., gave judgment for the defendant on the ground that the
Vienna bank had got title to the check under Austrian law
which the English courts were bound to recognize, and had
assigned that title to C. The judgment was affirmed by the
court of appeal. In the lower court the conclusion was based
upon the ground that under the decision of Alcock v. Smith8 2
78. Art. 12 of Uniform Law.
79. Arts. 15 and 39 of Uniform Law.
80. N. I. L. Sec. 23; B. E. A. Sec. 24.
81. [1905] 1 _ B. Div. 677 (C. A.), 74 L. J. K. B. 326.
82. [1892] 1 Ch. 238.
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the English law would recognize a title to a bill which had
been validly acquired under the lex rei sitae. The court
seemed to be of the opinion, also, that the judgment could be
based upon Section 72 of the Bills of Exchange Act if the
word "interpretation" of the indorsement included the legal
effect of the transfer by indorsement. The court of appeal
accepted the first ground and held that Section 72 of the Bills
of Exchange Act contained nothing to prevent the English
courts from recognizing the title acquired under Austrian law.
Although the action was between the payee and the indorsee
it would seem that the same result should follow where suit
is brought against the acceptor or the maker. Says Vaughan
Williams, L. J. :83
"But it would manifestly be an unsatisfactory state of the
law if the legal result is that the indorsement is effective to
give the indorsee of a bill a good title as against the payee,
but not effective according to English law to give that in-
dorsee a good title against the drawer or the acceptor. And
it would be convenient, as well from a legal as from a com-
mercial point of view, that it should be established that the
title by such an indorsement is good as against the original
parties to a negotiable instrument, having regard to the con-
tractual liability incurred by them thereby. I do not think
that Alcock v. Smith [1892] 1 Ch. 238, decides this question;
on the contrary, it seems to me that the judgments of Romer,
J., and the Court of Appeal both disclaim so doing; and,
further, it seems to me that the law as laid down by Pearson,
J., in In re Marseilles, etc., Land Company, 30 Ch. D. 598, and
by Lush, J., in Lebel v. Tucker, L. R. 3 Q. B. 77, 83 is, in
effect, authority to the contrary. At all events, it has never
been decided that the liability of an acceptor in England of a
bill drawn abroad or of the drawer of a cheque payable in
England amounts to a contract to pay on a forged indorsement
valid by the foreign law, but invalid by the law of England.
It may, however, be that the contract of the drawer or ac-
ceptor is to pay on any indorsement recognized by the law of
England, even though that indorsement be invalid according
to what I will call for convenience the local law of England.
I am disposed to think that this is the true contract. If the
contract of the drawer of a cheque or acceptor of a bill were
limited to payment on the indorsements valid by the English
local law an argument might be raised that, even though the
indorsement abroad was valid to legalize the possession by the
indorsee claiming under the foreign indorsement, yet he would
83. [1905] 1 K. B. Div. 677, 684-85.
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be guilty of a conversion if he used a negotiable instrument to
the possession of which he was entitled for the purpose of
obtaining and did obtain payment from an original party to the
negotiable instrument from which he could not have recovered
by process of law."
The transfer of chattels is governed today in England in
accordance with the following rules:
"Rule 143. An assignment of a movable which can be
touched (goods) giving a good title thereto according to the
law of the country where the movable is situate at the time of
the assignment (lex situs) is valid.
"Rule 145. . . The assignment of a movable, wher-
ever situate, in accordance with the law of the owner's domi-
cile is valid."8' 4
In so far as they are consistent with Section 72 (2) of the
Bills of Exchange Act these rules can be applied in England to
bills and notes. As the Bills of Exchange Act adopts on
principle the lex loci contractus as the law governing the
transfer of bills and notes, instead of the lex domicilii, Rule
145 can, of course, not be applied. But there is no reason why
Rule 143 should not be extended so as to embrace bills and
notes. In a case like Lebel v. Tucker"5 the law of the situs will
be excluded, however, under the positive provision of the
Bills of Exchange Act, 6 according to which the contract of
the acceptor of an English bill is to be interpreted as requiring
an indorsement in the sense of the English Act.
Which rule should be incorporated into the Uniform Law?
The writer would submit that the promise of the acceptor or
maker of a negotiable bill or note must be deemed to include
any party acquiring title to the instrument in accordance with
the law governing the contract of such maker or acceptor. As
the lex loci contractus determines the extent of the liability
of the maker and acceptor in general, a transfer satisfying
such law should be sufficient. The case of Embiricos v.
Anglo-Austrian Bank8 7 makes it clear, however, that the law
of the situs cannot be ignored. As a party executing a nego-
tiable instrument, or on becoming a party thereto, may be
reasonably charged with notice that the bill or note may be
transferred in a state other than the state where it was issued
or is payable, it would seem but fair to hold that he must
84. Dicey, pp. 519, 525.
85. (1867) L. R. 3 Q. B. 77.
86. B. E. A. Sec. 72 (2) par. 2.
87. [1905] 1 K. B. Div. 677 (C. A.), 74 L. J. K. B. 326.
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have submitted to the law of such state as regards the trans-'
fer of title. The adoption of an alternative rule in this
instance would promote the negotiability of bills and notes
and subserve the ends of justice. In the opinion of the
writer the Uniform Law should provide, therefore, that
each party be held if the holder of the instrument has
acquired title thereto in accordance with the municipal
law of the state where such party's contract was made,
and also if the title is unimpeachable under the law of the
place of transfer or the lex rei sitae. The provisions of the
Bills of Exchange Act on this point are inadequate.
3. HOLDER IN DUE COURSE.
According to Anglo-American law the equities attaching
to a bill or note will be cut off when the instrument passes
into the hands of a holder in due course. On the continent,
where the holder in due course is unknown, full legal title will
be acquired if the purchaser acted in good faith. The Nego-
tiable Instruments Law aimed to unify the law of this cqountry
with respect to the question of what constitutes value, but
failed to accomplish its purpose, for the New York courts
adhere still to their former doctrine that a transfer of a bill
or note by way of collateral security for an antecedent debt
does not constitute value.8 8 Assuming that a bill or note is
transferred in a jurisdiction where the holder in due course is
unknown to the law, or in a jurisdiction where the term
"holder in due course" is defined differently than it is under
the lex loci of the maker's or acceptor's contract, which law
is to control'? The American courts apply now the law of
the place of indorsement, s9 but more generally the law of the
place of payment, 0 that is, the law governing in their opinion,
the obligation of the maker's -and acceptor's contract. On
principle the question relates clearly to the tenor of the con-
tract of the different parties and should be determined, there-
fore, in accordance with the lex loci of each contract.
(To be concluded.)
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88. The appellate division of the supreme court of New York has held so
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